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INTRODUCTION 
“Price is what you pay. Value is what you get.” - Warren Buffett 
From 2010-2011, the National Football League generated just under $9 billion 
in revenue. Over the same period, the English Premier League garnered around £2.3 
billion (about $3.7 billion) in revenue. These figures represent the prices that fans, 
sponsors, and broadcasting companies pay these two leagues each year, and they clearly 
indicate that in their respective markets (for the NFL, the United States; for the EPL, the 
United Kingdom), each has established a dominant economic position in the industry. 
However, the value that these leagues generate goes far beyond simple comparisons of 
financial statements – the NFL and the EPL are also the most important sports 
organizations in their respective markets based on popularity, average attendance, and 
other measures of social impact. This thesis seeks to explore how each of these two 
leagues has risen to the top not only in terms of economic capital, but also in terms of 
other measures of influence, especially social capital.1 Using the findings of this 
exploration, this thesis will posit a model for other professional sports leagues seeking 
to achieve similar success. 
 
Background and History - National Football League 
 The National Football League, officially established in 1920, operates as an 
unincorporated association, rather than a traditional for-profit corporation. Practically 
speaking, this designation means that the league office is not subject to income tax 
because it does not make a profit, while each individual team is responsible for paying                                                         
1 Sandalio Gomez, Kimio Kase and Ignacio Urrutia, Value Creation and Sports Management (Cambridge 
University Press, 2010). 
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taxes. The league is comprised of 32 franchises spread across the United States. The 
NFL (as a whole) is managed by the owners of each of these 32 franchises, along with 
the commissioner, who wields disciplinary and decision-making authority. At present, 
the league has the “most centralized operations of any traditional league,” with $5.2 
billion in media revenue per season split among the teams.2 Even after a lengthy labor 
dispute over the collective bargaining agreement threatened to disrupt the 2012 season, 
59 percent of Americans claimed to follow the NFL.3 More Americans cite professional 
football as their favorite sport (34 percent) than the next three professional sports 
combined – professional baseball, auto racing, and men’s professional basketball.4  
 
Background and History - English Premier League 
 The English Premier League as it exists today was established as a limited 
company in 1992 when first division clubs from the then-104-year-old English Football 
League resigned, reorganizing in order to capture more revenue.5 The limited company 
designation means that the EPL essentially operates as a corporation owned by the 20 
member clubs – each club acts a shareholder with voting power, and they elect a 
chairman, chief executive, and board of directors to oversee management of the league. 
The Football Association, the governing body of English soccer, is typically not 
involved in the day-to-day operations of the Premier League, but it does hold veto 
                                                        
2 Mark Conrad, The Business of Sports: A Primer for Journalists (New York: Routledge, 2011). 
3 Harris Interactive, " Football Continues to be America's Favorite Sport; the Gap With Baseball Narrows 
Slightly this Year," HarrisInteractive.com, January 17, 2013, 
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/NewsRoom/HarrisPolls/tabid/447/ctl/ReadCustom%20Default/mid/150
8/ArticleId/1136/Default.aspx. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Frank P. Jozsa, Global Sports: Cultures, Markets, and Organizations (Singapore: World Scientific, 
2009). 
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power as a “special shareholder” in electing a new chairman or chief executive or 
adopting new rules. 
 
Defining Value Creation 
 Instituto de Estudios Superiores de la Empresa (IESE) Business School 
professors Sandalio Gomez, Kimio Kase, and Ignacio Urrutia put forth four types of 
value that sports organizations create in their book, Value Creation and Sports 
Management. These four types of value are economic, social, historic, and media 
capital. This project focuses on only two of these value categories – economic and 
social capital – because these types of value cover both the tangible and intangible 
importance of a professional sports organization. Economic capital includes the 
traditional measures of business success that are often easily quantified, including 
revenues, profits, market share, return on investment, and other objective indicators of 
the economic value created by a firm. Social capital, on the other hand, includes more 
subjective, qualitative outcomes of what a business performs. For example, in a sports 
context, the positive effect that a professional sports organization has on participation in 
youth sports might be one way of creating social capital. Other types of social value 
creation include participation in charitable causes and other forms of “corporate social 
responsibility” programs.  
This thesis uses established academic frameworks as the basis for not only 
identifying how the National Football League and English Premier League create 
economic value, but also how the environment in which they operate and the strategic 
resources they leverage affect how they create social value. 
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Definitions and Style Notes 
1) This thesis will use “football” to refer to American football, and “soccer” to 
refer to traditional European football, except for when referring a European organizing 
body that uses “football” in the title (e.g., the Football Association). This is to avoid 
ambiguity when discussing two sports that often use overlapping terminology.  
2) This thesis will refer to the “English Premier League” (or “Premier League” 
or “EPL”) as such, rather than using the current sponsored title, the “Barclays Premier 
League” or “Barclays Premiership”. Again, this is to enhance clarity and consistency for 
the reader.  
3) Direct quotes are italicized. Quotes from print and web sources are not 
italicized. 
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PART I: EXTERNAL ANALYSIS 
 A professional sports league, like any other firm in any other industry, does not 
operate in a vacuum. The environmental factors that influence how a business operates 
are often unpredictable, variable in magnitude, and sometimes difficult to even identify. 
However, these truths have scarcely prevented the academic and professional 
communities from trying to create systematic ways of exploring these external factors, 
in order to understand them and even leverage them into success. This section relies on 
a particular pair of these well-established academic frameworks to guide and organize 
the analysis of the business environments in which the National Football League and 
English Premier League operate.  
 The first such framework through which one can set the general context for each 
league is a modified version of the PEST model. First proposed by Harvard Business 
School Professor Emeritus of Business Administration Francis Aguilar, this model 
originally considered the political, economic, social, and technological factors that 
affect how a business operates.6 Other business strategy theorists have added to, 
changed, and/or redefined the four PEST categories, first put forth in Aguilar’s 1967 
book Scanning the Business Environment.  
 For the purposes of this thesis, the modifications made to the original four 
categories ensure that the most important external factors influencing each league are 
addressed in appropriate depth. The first adjustment to the framework is to consolidate 
political and legal factors into one section. More recent iterations of the PEST model 
(e.g. the PESTLE model) often include a legal element as an additional set of factors, 
                                                        
6 Francis J. Aguilar, Scanning the Business Environment (New York: Macmillan, 1967). 
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but political and legal influences are intertwined enough in the professional sports 
industry to discuss them together. The other change to Aguilar’s model extends the 
“social” category into a more comprehensive set of drivers, or “socio-cultural” factors. 
Redefining this category allows for a more thorough analysis of important cultural 
influences on each league and how they affect social value creation. 
 The PEST model and most modified versions of it are usually tuned towards 
discussing the factors that affect the traditional business operations of a firm. Including 
the social value component proposed by Gomez, Kase, and Urrutia in this framework 
results in more comprehensive conclusions to apply towards a model for professional 
sports league success and value creation. In each of the following sections, the factors 
identified represent a few of the most important influences from what may be a wide 
selection. However, this framework analysis seeks to only set the context for each 
league, and it need not be exhaustive. 
 
Modified PEST Analysis - National Football League 
Political/Legal Factors 
Factor 1: Antitrust Exemption for Broadcasting Rights 
 No other single legislative decision has impacted the National Football League’s 
ability to create economic value more than the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961. The 
Act effectively exempts the NFL (and, to a lesser extent, the other major American 
professional sports leagues) from antitrust restrictions in negotiating “pooled” 
broadcasting rights. In other words, the Act allows NFL teams to negotiate joint, 
exclusive agreements with broadcast partners as a group, instead of individually. The 
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Act views each franchise as part of an interdependent network of partners, as opposed 
to a group of competitors. This aligns closely with the NFL’s key resource of parity and 
revenue sharing, as discussed later on in this thesis. According to Martin Cave and 
Robert W. Crandall, “the result [of the Act] was a dramatic increase in the value of 
national network televisions sports rights throughout the 1960s as a network triopoly 
bid aggressively for the right to broadcast NFL games.”7 This legal decision set the 
foundation for the explosion in broadcasting rights fees that would eventually occur in 
the late 1990s. The legal environment could not be more favorable for the NFL to 
command such extraordinary economic value and the league capitalizes on this in 
spades: the TV deals with CBS, NBC, ESPN, and FOX running through the 2022 
season collectively generate about $3 billion, or about one third of the league’s annual 
revenue.8 As for social value, the NFL leans so heavily on television as its main 
distribution channel that these national contracts represent the lifeblood of the social 
reach of the organization. The league claims that 200 million unique viewers tuned in to 
the 2011 season – and as the last section of this thesis will address, the success of a 
professional sports league hinges on the cultural momentum that such extensive 
distribution can provide.9 
 
 
                                                         
7 Martin Cave and Robert W. Crandall, "Sports Rights and the Broadcast Industry," The Economic 
Journal (Blackwell Publishers), 2001. 
8 NFL Communications, The tradition continues: NFL to remain on broadcast TV, December 14, 2011, 
http://nflcommunications.com/2011/12/14/the-tradition-continues-nfl-to-remain-on-broadcast-tv/. 
9 NFL Communications, More than 200 million tune in to NFL games in 2011 — NFL TV recap, January 
5, 2012, http://nflcommunications.com/2012/01/05/more-than-200-million-tune-in-to-nfl-games-in-2011-
nfl-tv-recap/. 
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Factor 2: Public Sector Support 
 Relative to other countries, the United States exhibits more local governmental 
support of professional sports leagues. Major League Soccer Vice President of Club 
Services Declan Bolger notes: 
“[After the antitrust exemption] the second [example of how the government 
intervenes in the operations of American sports leagues] would be more local - 
what the government believes their role, versus the private sector role, is in 
creating and supporting leagues…the relative openness for municipalities to 
help fund sporting venues which doesn’t exist in Europe. […] The U.S. is the 
most capitalist country in the world, but it has the most socialist-based sports 
system.”10  
The willingness of local and state governments to fund facilities for NFL teams 
provides a favorable environment for the league to capitalize on fan interest and avidity. 
Judith Grant Long, a Harvard University professor of urban planning, calculates that 
league-wide, 70 percent of the capital cost of NFL stadiums has been provided by 
taxpayers, not NFL owners.11 Unlike other traditional business endeavors, NFL owners 
are not entirely “on the hook” for the infrastructure investment required to make their 
product viable. While this external capital investment only represents part of the 
league’s ability to generate economic and even social value (since it is quite difficult to 
generate social value if at least some fans cannot actually watch their team play live), it 
effectively ensures iterative success in that fans are invested not only emotionally, but 
                                                        
10 Declan Bolger, interview by Keagen Edwards, (October 28, 2013). 
11 Gregg Easterbrook, How the NFL Fleeces Taxpayers, October 2013, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/10/how-the-nfl-fleeces-taxpayers/309448/. 
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also financially and politically as well. Politicians could not afford to take the risk of 
shouldering the burden of millions of dollars in venue investments if the popularity and 
local economic impact of the league could not justify it.  
Taxpayer Burden of Select NFL Stadiums 
Team Stadium Cost % Paid by Tax* 
Minnesota Vikings Vikings Stadium $1.1 billion ~50% 
San Francisco 49ers Levi’s Stadium $1.2 billion ~90%** 
Seattle Seahawks Century Link Field $590M ~70% 
* Tax includes “hard taxes” (e.g. sales taxes) and “soft taxes” (e.g. tourism taxes) 
**Santa Clara Stadium Authority loaned $950M on behalf of taxpayers12 
 
Factor 3: Tax-Exempt Status 
 In 1966, Congress officially classified the NFL as a 501(c)6 organization - a 
non-for-profit designation that groups the league together with chambers of commerce 
and boards of trade. In fact, on its IRS tax form, the NFL classifies itself as a “trade 
association promoting interests of its 32 member clubs.” Almost all of the league 
office's $255 million in revenue in 2011 came from team membership dues, paid by 
franchises to the league office, which (if the league were not tax-exempt) could be 
written off as a tax deduction as a “business expense” regardless.13 In essence, the tax-
exempt status of the NFL serves as a reminder that the economic value created by the 
league occurs primarily at the franchise level, but that the organization provided by the 
league office strongly facilitates this value creation. While this may indicate a detriment 
to the league’s creation of social value at first glance, the league itself does exactly 
“what it says on the tin”: it promotes the interests of member clubs, each of which then                                                         
12 Ibid. 
13 Brent Schrotenboer, To tax or not? The NFL's relationship with the IRS, May 30, 2013, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2013/05/29/nfl-sports-leagues-irs-tax-exemption/2370945/. 
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pays the appropriate taxes, which funnel back to the city, state, and/or federal 
government. 
 
Economic Factors 
Factor 1: Macroeconomic Trends 
 Macroeconomic factors, like unemployment rates, trends in gross domestic 
product, and especially inflation, normally represent important considerations for large-
scale enterprises. Inflation does influence the operational costs of the league, including 
the cost of infrastructure. However, for the NFL, the nature of the product (i.e. 
professional sports) offers some insulation from such factors. Rob Lampman, partner at 
Eiger Marketing Group, puts it thusly: “the only impact of inflation is that it’s used as a 
sales tool […] it’s just a justification for trying to increase rights fees.”14 The NFL can 
leverage external macroeconomic factors in creating economic value through 
broadcasting rights fees more than those same factors can negatively affect the day-to-
day economic operations of the league.  
 On a general scale, however, the NFL cannot completely escape a wide-scale 
economic downturn without marginal decline in certain metrics. For example, through 
the recession starting in 2008, attendance numbers fell across the league for the first 
time in years as consumers were forced to redirect discretionary income away from 
attending live sports, including the NFL. 
                                                        
14 Rob Lampman, interview by Keagen Edwards, (October 10, 2013). 
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The following table shows attendance figures from 2006-201215: 
Year Avg Attendance/Game Total Attendance 
2006 68,712 17,590,340 
2007 68,763 17,603,314 
2008 68,264 17,334,276 
2009 67,498 17,146,404 
2010 66,953 17,007,172 
2011 67,358 17,124,389 
2012 67,604 17,301,800 
 
Though this dip in attendance may seem insignificant (only about 2.5 percent 
from 2007 to 2010), the economic and social value of the league did suffer due to the 
recession. Ticket revenue flattened at about $1.3 billion from 2008 to 2012, and the 
owners came up “about $1 billion short of the growth in real dollars they were 
projecting […] in 2006.”16 In essence, the combination of the economic downturn and 
the labor stoppage of the summer of 2011 resulted in a stagnation of the momentum that 
had been building since the mid-90s. Whether the league can recover and start back on 
the path of growth and progress in terms of value creation remains to be seen. 
 
Socio-Cultural Factors 
Factor 1: Established Popularity 
 The NFL holds more widespread popularity than any other major American 
professional sports league. The results of a 2011 Adweek/ Harris Poll indicate, “two 
thirds of U.S. adults say they currently watch NFL football (64%), including almost 
                                                        
15 Winthrop Intelligence, NFL and NCAA Division I FBS Home Attendance Numbers, 2012, 
http://winthropintelligence.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/NFL-and-NCAA-Division-I-FBS-Home-
Attendance-Numbers1.png. 
16 Matthew Futterman, The NFL's $1 Billion Game of Chicken, February 17, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703373404576148712424300234. 
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three quarters of men (73%) and over half of women (55%).”17 The league garners 
higher ratings, greater per-game attendance, and more overall revenue than any of the 
other “Big Four” American leagues (i.e. Major League Baseball, the National 
Basketball Association, and the National Hockey League). Perhaps even more telling, 
however, is that the NFL reigns in terms of popularity when it comes to entertainment 
as a whole. Individual broadcasts of NFL games “accounted for 23 of the 25 most-
watched TV shows among all programming and the 16 most-watched shows on cable” 
in 2011, and historically, the top 21 TV broadcasts of all-time are NFL Super Bowls.18 
Not only do these figures accentuate the importance of television as the NFL’s most 
important distribution channel, they also indicate how Americans are drawn to the NFL 
for a variety of reasons. 
Factor 2: Catharsis, Escape, and Aesthetic Appeal  
The NFL represents a unique outlet for catharsis and escape as part of the very 
nature of the sport. Research indicates, “collision sports, such as rugby and American 
football […] have a strong attraction to fans who need to escape from their tightly 
controlled work and social environments.”19 Combined with the integrative social 
appeal of being involved in a communal activity, the NFL offers fans the chance to 
fulfill the dual role of breaking the mechanistic constructs of a work environment and 
reinforcing a tightly knit sense of belonging. On a more basic level, the aesthetics of the 
                                                        
17 Bill Gorman, No Surprise: 64% Of Americans Watch NFL Football; 73% of Men, 55% of Women, 
October 14, 2011, http://tvbythenumbers.zap2it.com/2011/10/14/no-surprise-64-americans-watch-nfl-
football-73-of-men-55-of-women/107308/. 
18 NFL Communications, More than 200 million tune in to NFL games in 2011 — NFL TV recap, January 
5, 2012, http://nflcommunications.com/2012/01/05/more-than-200-million-tune-in-to-nfl-games-in-2011-
nfl-tv-recap/. 
19 Hans Westerbeek and Aaron Smith, Sports Business in the Global Marketplace (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003). 
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NFL’s most basic product – professional football - is unrivaled, appealing to consumers 
of all demographics. Lampman notes this as a key to social-cultural success: “The 
product on the field is the athletes, (they) are amazing. […] they do things that normal 
people can’t do.”20 Michael Oriard, author of Brand NFL: Marketing and Selling 
America’s Favorite Sport posits, “the tension between the hit-or-be-hit side and the 
ballet side [earlier described as ‘perfect passes, circus catches, breakaway runs, etc’] 
defines the essence of football.”21 Soccer often lays claim to the title of “the beautiful 
game,” but Americans clearly find football (and, by extension, the NFL) beautiful in its 
own regard.  
Factor 3: Gambling 
A socio-cultural factor that ensures a relatively sustainable competitive 
advantage for the NFL in the professional sports industry is the popularity of gambling 
on NFL games. Rob Lampman notes, “Gambling drives the NFL […] it’s the single 
biggest factor that makes that league popular.”22 While the league officially distances 
itself from this “shadow economy” of gambling, both legal and illegal, in the interest of 
maintaining the authentic, family-friendly image it works so hard to protect, it is still an 
influence ensuring competitive advantage in the professional sports industry. According 
to the Nevada Gaming Commission, nearly 41 percent of the $3.2 billion wagered 
legally on sports can be attributed to football, while estimates of total illegal wagering 
                                                        
20 Rob Lampman, interview by Keagen Edwards, (October 10, 2013). 
21 Michael Oriard, Brand NFL: Making and Selling America's Favorite Sport (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2007). 
22 Rob Lampman, interview by Keagen Edwards, (October 10, 2013). 
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on the NFL are close to $100 billion worldwide.2324 The sheer volume of money 
changing hands indicates a widespread interest – both personal and financial – in the 
league that goes beyond the accounting statements of any individual franchise or the 
league office. The attachment that gamblers have to the league results in secondary 
value being generated for the league. For example, when gamblers tune in to a matchup 
that they have bet on, that boost in viewers, no matter how insignificant, is 
indistinguishable from any other rise in ratings. 
 
Technological Factors 
Factor 1: “DVR Proof” 
 Watching NFL football on television has remained the primary mode of 
consumption for fans since the middle of the last century, but technological changes 
have influenced how that consumption occurs. Most notably, the advent of digital video 
recording systems (DVRs) has rendered the concept of “appointment viewing” obsolete 
for many forms of television entertainment. However, live sports offers its own built-in 
resistance to the DVR revolution, and especially so in the case of the NFL, for a 
combination of reasons. For one, the social entertainment value of viewing a game 
hinges almost entirely upon not knowing the outcome. This uncertainty (called 
“eustress”, a portmanteau of euphoria and stress, by psychologist Daniel Wann) is time-
bound – that is to say, in the age of instant information availability via social media, 
fans must watch a game at the time it is played if they want to experience the full                                                         
23 Miranda Green, NFL’s Shadow Economy of Gambling and Fantasy Football is a Multibillion Dollar 
Business, October 26, 2012, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/10/06/nfl-s-shadow-economy-
of-gambling-and-fantasy-football-is-a-multibillion-dollar-business.html. 
24 American Gaming Association, Sports Wagering, June 30, 2012, 
http://www.americangaming.org/industry-resources/research/fact-sheets/sports-wagering. 
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eustress effect. Because each NFL team only plays 16 regular season games a year, the 
entertainment value of each individual game is elevated relative to, for example, one of 
162 regular season Major League Baseball games. Since the NFL is virtually DVR-
proof as a result of information availability and its limited schedule, it can demand 
higher rights fees from broadcasters because advertising time is inherently more 
valuable (i.e., expensive) when viewers are unable to skip past it. This boosts economic 
value for the league, especially in comparison to other forms of television entertainment 
without the same insulation from the advent of DVR. 
Factor 2: 24/7/365 Consumption Options 
 Technological advances allow NFL fans to follow their team and the league in 
more ways than ever. For illustration’s sake, here are just a few of the options available 
to an average Seattle Seahawks fan for “consuming” the NFL: 
Hourly:  
- Follow the league on Twitter (@NFL, 5.3M followers, 36 tweets/day) 
- Like the NFL on Facebook (/NFL, 8.5M likes, 500K “talking about”) 
- Follow the Seahawks on Twitter (@Seahawks, 300K followers, 12 tweets/day) 
- Subscribe to NFL Network (24/7 NFL coverage, incl. Thursday Night Football) 
Daily: 
- Watch ESPN’s NFL studio shows (NFL Live, NFL Insiders, NFL Primetime, NFL 32) 
- Watch Sunday Night Football (NBC) and Monday Night Football (ESPN) 
- Watch the regional broadcast of the Seahawks game 
Monthly: 
- Follow the NFL Combine (February) 
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- Watch coverage of the NFL Draft (April/May) 
- Watch HBO’s Hard Knocks and NFL Preseason games, draft fantasy team 
(August/September) 
In essence, technological advances in social media and expanded television 
options ensure that a fan can effectively interact with the NFL quite literally whenever 
and wherever they want to. 
 
Modified PEST Analysis - English Premier League 
Political/Legal Factors 
Factor 1: The European Commission 
 The European Commission has presided over a number of cases that dictate the 
English Premier League’s ability to generate economic (and, by extension, social) 
value. First, as of the 2012 season, the EPL sells its broadcasting rights on a collective 
basis, similar to the NFL. However, the functional reasoning behind why this collective 
sale is allowed is slightly different than in the case of the NFL. The European 
Commission considers the EPL collective selling legal under an exemption to Article 
81(1) of the EC Treaty (the de facto equivalent of the Sherman Antitrust Act in the 
United States) in that collective broadcast agreement “[allows] consumers a fair share of 
the resulting benefit.”25 As with the NFL, the collective sale of broadcasting rights 
allows the EPL to demand high rights fees, but the revenue sharing structure is radically 
different. According to the league,  
                                                        
25 European Commission, Article 81 of the EC Treaty (ex Article 85), 2007, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/legislation/treaties/ec/art81_en.html. 
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“domestic broadcast revenue is divided on a 50:25:25 basis; 50% is divided 
equally between the clubs; 25% is awarded on a merit basis determined by a 
club’s final league position and the final 25% is distributed as a facilities fee for 
the number of matches shown on television involving the club.”26 
Whereas revenue is divided equally in the NFL (to the tune of about $200 million per 
team including all media rights), success on the field correlates to economic value for 
individual clubs in the EPL. This last season saw league champions Manchester United 
draw over £60 million in TV revenue, while the bottom club, QPR, earned around 
£40M. However, at the end of this season, which is the first of a new rights deal that 
totals nearly £3 billion, the league winners are likely to see over £100 million in TV 
revenue compared to around £60 million for the bottom club.27 While revenue is shared 
to some extent in the EPL thanks to the European Commission’s relaxed view on 
collective selling, the ability to create economic value still tends to pool at the top of the 
league as winners receive more compensation than teams in danger of relegation. 
Accordingly, the competitive parity on the field is less evident than it is in the NFL. 
Factor 2: Relative Lack of Public Sector Support 
 Unlike in the United States, the various governmental entities of the United 
Kingdom have exhibited a reluctance to provide public sector funding for EPL 
infrastructure and stadiums. There are two primary reasons for this; one, the club model 
of European soccer (including the EPL) lends itself to financing models that are more 
heavily reliant on private investment, and two, the cultural inclination towards 
                                                        
26 Premier League, How does the Premier League sell its TV rights?, 2013, 
http://www.premierleague.com/en-gb/fans/faqs/how-does-the-premier-league-sell-its-tv-rights.html. 
27 Ibid. 
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professional sports that backs the political willingness to fund stadiums in the US does 
not exist as strongly in the UK. To the first point, the EPL club model creates a type of 
capitalist, zero-sum game where clubs must invest in their own infrastructure without 
the assistance of the taxpayer to survive. For example, a distance of less than two miles 
separates the stadia of two rival London clubs, Chelsea and Fulham. Passing a funding 
measure for the expansion of either of the clubs and not the other would prove difficult 
when half of the taxpaying voters support the other team. Even in areas where one club 
dominates the voting populace, public funding is limited. Tottenham Hotspur FC’s new 
Northumberland Development Project, which includes a yet-to-be-named stadium 
proposed to supplant White Hart Lane as the home of Spurs, has only secured about £50 
million in public funding towards its estimated £400 million cost.28 This trend continues 
beyond the Premier League, indicating a more widespread cultural aversion in the 
United Kingdom towards public funding of stadiums. Even the iconic Wembley 
Stadium, which has hosted dozens of international sporting events, was renovated in 
2006 with only 21 percent of the £757 million project cost backed by public sector 
funding, according to the National Audit Office.29 Declan Bolger notes,  
“I’ve got friends who’ve owned Premier League clubs, and they’re quite taken 
aback at the support that the municipalities provide [leagues in the United 
States]. There’s no penny bed tax in Europe, in England, to support 
stadiums.”30  
                                                        
28 "Supporting Our Future: A Community Share Proposal to Support Northumberland Park 
Development," 2013, http://www.spursfuture.org/CSPropTHFCSoF.pdf . 
29 National Audit Office, The English National Stadium Project at Wembley, 2003, 
http://www.nao.org.uk/report/the-english-national-stadium-project-at-wembley/. 
30 Declan Bolger, interview by Keagen Edwards, (October 28, 2013). 
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In essence, what the UK exhibits is the opposite of the US in terms of political 
support for professional sports infrastructure investment. Clubs evolved from small, 
local organizations with little economic impact, while in the NFL, new franchises have 
an immediate economic impact on their home city. In addition, the physical proximity 
between clubs lowers the ability of any one club to put pressure on a local government 
to fund infrastructure. Therefore, the EPL as a whole must overcome the burden of 
private investment to create economic value, as opposed to receiving the generous head 
start that taxpaying fans (and even non-fans) provide to the NFL. As a result, private 
investment in the EPL remains the lifeblood of the organization – foreign capital from 
owners like Chelsea’s Roman Abramovich (net worth: $10 billion) and Manchester 
City’s Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan (net worth: $31.5 billion) keeps 
private spending at the franchise level high.31 
 
Economic Factors 
Factor 1: General Economic Trends 
 As with the NFL in the United States, the ability of the EPL to create economic 
value is sensitive to general macroeconomic trends. The economic recession starting in 
2008 was not limited to the United States – markets and industries worldwide felt the 
negative effects. As one might expect, the effects on the EPL were similar to those on 
the NFL – combined club revenue in the EPL reached a plateau that lasted through 
2010. However, the EPL bounced back more quickly than the NFL did in terms of 
creating economic value, due in no small part to new TV deals that came into effect in 
                                                        
31 Forbes, Profile: Roman Abramovich, March 2013, http://www.forbes.com/profile/roman-abramovich/. 
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2010 and 2013. League revenue increased nearly 25 percent from 2010/11 to 2012/13, 
settling closer to £2.5 billion. The ability of the EPL to rebound from the economic 
downtown indicates that new TV revenue can serve as an effective stopgap solution to 
negative macroeconomic influences. 
 
Socio-Cultural Factors 
Factor 1: Geographic Structure 
 The unique structure of the English Premier League results in a significantly 
different cultural approach to the league. Geographically speaking, clubs are much 
closer together, and the tradition and history of the club plays a much bigger role in 
ensuring social identification amongst fans. With one club for every 4,750 square miles 
of domestic land area (compared to one NFL team per 118,000 square miles in the US), 
identifying with a team in person is much easier, logistically speaking. A Premier 
League survey from 2007 indicates that the fans travel an average of only about 50 
miles to attend home matches.32 The clubs can create social value in person at the local 
level much more easily when their avid fans are right down the street, as opposed to 
hundreds of miles away. This ties in closely with how the clubs were organized before 
the creation of the Premier League in 1992 – the Football Association and the Football 
League effectively ran the clubs as social entities that did not focus primarily on 
revenue generation.33  
                                                        
32 Premier League, "National Fan Survey," 2007, 
http://www.premierleague.com/content/dam/premierleague/site-content/News/publications/fan-
surveys/national-fan-survey-2007-08.pdf. 
33 Declan Bolger, interview by Keagen Edwards, (October 28, 2013). 
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However, this geographic clustering creates a situation in which the EPL must 
rely more heavily on international marketing to generate revenue. There are only a 
certain number of discretionary pounds available in the UK for the EPL to capture, and 
the league’s revenue-generating focus since its inception has led to more and more 
international marketing efforts in order to create economic value. According to Declan 
Bolger, “there’s no doubt that the overall, collective interest in [soccer] has never been 
greater.”34 The EPL stands to capture value from both domestic and international 
markets on a greater scale than ever before as international distribution channels grow 
and reach more and more potential fans. 
Factor 2: Cultural Attitudes 
 As a whole, the game of soccer appeals more to the consumer on the grounds of 
aesthetic technique and finesse, rather than sheer strength or the violence offered in the 
game of football. Fans surveyed by the Premier League in 2007 rated “Technical Skill” 
as the highest influencer of their opinion of players.35 However, the on-field product of 
the EPL is unique in that consumers perceive it as “less pretty” than the style of soccer 
played in other professional domestic leagues.36 Interestingly, this parallels well with 
the appeal of NFL – the “tension” described by Oriard between tough, hard-nosed 
action and displays of technical skill is balanced more evenly in the EPL than in other 
domestic soccer leagues. The relative quality of the athletes is similar, as top 
international players are drawn to the EPL as one of the most prestigious of leagues in 
international soccer. Accordingly, those watching for the eustress and aesthetic                                                         
34 Ibid. 
35 Premier League, "National Fan Survey," 2007, 
http://www.premierleague.com/content/dam/premierleague/site-content/News/publications/fan-
surveys/national-fan-survey-2007-08.pdf. 
36 Rob Lampman, interview by Keagen Edwards, (October 10, 2013). 
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elements of the game are treated to the best of the best, and the EPL builds on that 
reputation in creating social value for its fans.  
 
Technological 
Factor 1: “DVR Proof” 
The English Premier League has taken several steps in recent years to remain 
competitive when it comes to digital distribution. Like the NFL, the EPL enjoys a 
natural insulation from the threat of DVR technology when negotiating rights fees. 
However, with a slightly longer league schedule (38 games, one at home and one away 
against every other EPL team), the relative viewing value of each game is not as high 
compared to the NFL. Without a playoff system, the “mini-competitions” that drive fan 
interest through to the end of the league season bolster the value of the content that the 
EPL can offer for digital distribution. This represents a strategic resource that will be 
addressed in more depth during the internal analysis section.  
Factor 2: International Distribution 
 Given that the EPL relies so much more heavily on international revenue due to 
a smaller domestic fan base, it has had to find unique ways to effectively distribute its 
content (namely, game broadcasts) to international markets. Other than actually 
travelling to play games live, as clubs do for the biennial Barclays Asia Trophy 
competition, the EPL also uses digital distribution on both traditional television and 
online platforms. The EPL has entered a relatively untapped market for international 
soccer in the United States by way of a $250 million rights deal with NBC over the next 
three seasons. New content includes over 1600 hours of programming, studio shows, 
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and online-integrated coverage of the league.37 While only 9 percent of Americans over 
12 years old consider themselves avid fans of international soccer (including the EPL), 
the non-exclusive nature of sports fandom (and by extension, economic and social 
involvement in sports) dictates that the EPL stands to increase this number through new 
broadcasting and distribution partnerships.38 
 
Modified PEST Analysis Conclusion 
 In theory, the National Football League and English Premier League would face 
some similar influences in the business environment, independent of the geographic 
market that they occupied. However, the specific factors that dictate the ability of each 
of these leagues to create value are far from identical. This is partly due to the way each 
league has evolved over the years, but these influences pose different challenges for 
each league as they continue trying to maintain the top spot in terms of value creation in 
their respective markets. 
                                                        
37 Kevin Baxter, NBC goes all in with coverage of English Premier League soccer, August 10, 2013, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/10/sports/la-sp-baxter-soccer-20130811. 
38 Luker, Soccer Popularity Continues to Climb, 2012, http://sportspath.typepad.com/files/soccer-
popularity-continues-to-climb.pdf. 
Factor Type National Football League English Premier League 
Political-Legal 
Antitrust Exemption 
Public Sector Support 
Tax-Exempt Status European Commission Lack of Public Sector Support 
Economic Macroeconomic Trends 
Socio-Cultural 
Established Popularity 
Catharsis/Escape 
Gambling 
Geographic Structure 
Cultural Attitudes 
Technological “DVR Proof” 24/7/365 Consumption International Distribution 
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Porter’s Five Forces Analysis 
 Michael Porter’s Five Forces approach represents one of the most important 
theories in business strategy study. His model is primarily used to determine the 
“attractiveness”, or profitability potential, for firms within an industry. Each force 
describes a different set of influences on the firms of that industry. For both the NFL 
and EPL, the industry in question is professional sports; however, each league does not 
necessarily encounter the same forces to the same extent. This analysis addresses how 
the Five Forces affect each league. 
 
Threat of Entrants 
 The first of these forces is the threat of new entrants. Porter explains, “new 
entrants to an industry bring new capacity and a desire to gain market share that puts 
pressure on prices, costs, and the rate of investment necessary to compete.”39 Barriers to 
entry in an industry include economies of scale, consumer switching costs, capital 
requirements, access to distribution channels, and government policies. Both the NFL 
and EPL enjoy significant insulation from the threat of new entrants as a result of a 
number of these barriers to entry being so high in the professional sports industry. The 
economies of scale are extreme – ticket sales, licensing deals, and broadcasting 
contracts put less strain on the resources of a league when it is firmly established in the 
market. Consumers are loyal to their team, and while it is possible for an NFL or EPL 
fan to become a fan of a new professional sports team, the sports industry is unique in                                                         
39 Michael Porter, "The Five Competitive Forces That Shape Strategy," Havard Business Review 
(Harvard Business Publishing), 2008. 
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that fandom is not a zero-sum game, so leagues can create social value for fans 
regardless of how many other teams they support. With that said, assuming that fans 
have a finite amount of discretionary income to spend on their fandom, the economic 
value a league can generate might fluctuate on a franchise to franchise basis if a new 
professional sports league were to enter the market. However, for the leagues at the top 
(i.e. the NFL and EPL), consumer spending patterns are established enough to diminish 
the threat of new entrants by keeping switching costs high. In terms of capital 
requirements and access to distribution channels, the barriers to entry are very high, 
given “the momentum of broadcast [rights] fees”, according to Rob Lampman.40 If a 
new league wants to distribute content to consumers on the scale of the NFL or the 
EPL, it will either have to either raise an exorbitant amount of capital to compete in 
traditional distribution channels or leverage new distribution channels. Specific to the 
EPL, the threat of entrants is slightly different in that new entrants to the league itself 
might affect how the league as a whole creates capital, given the promotion and 
relegation system. However, even these “in-house” entrants face the same barriers: 
according to Declan Bolger,  “The jump from Championship to Premier League is much 
harder than it is perceived publicly to be.”41 All told, the threat to top leagues like the 
NFL and EPL of new entrants to the industry is very low, allowing the leagues to keep a 
hold on their competitive advantage. 
 
Threat of Substitutes 
                                                        
40 Rob Lampman, interview by Keagen Edwards, (October 10, 2013). 
41 Declan Bolger, interview by Keagen Edwards, (October 28, 2013). 
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 The second of the five forces is the threat of substitutes. According to Porter, a 
substitute “performs the same or a similar function as an industry’s product by different 
means.”42 For the professional sports industry, the “function” is to provide 
entertainment. Accordingly, any substitute to the NFL or EPL would provide 
entertainment in a way other than professional sports. The most analogous 
entertainment source to the NFL is amateur sports, most notably college football and 
basketball. While amateur sports are also a substitute for the EPL, the threat is not as 
strong in the United Kingdom as it is in the United States. According to a 2012 Harris 
Poll, 11 percent of American fans cite college football (organized by the NCAA) as 
their favorite sport, less than professional baseball (16%), but more than auto racing 
(8%) and professional basketball (7%).43 While the NFL still sits atop the standings at 
34%, college football is indeed a viable substitute to the NFL in that it provides amateur 
sports entertainment. However, the NFL has its own built-in insulation from this threat: 
the most popular amateur sport in America is effectively the breeding ground for its 
own talent. In other words, most of the talent in the NFL started in the college ranks, 
and the success of the NFL and NCAA football are accordingly intertwined. The EPL 
faces a different set of substitutes for professional sport. In the UK, amateur sport is 
more participatory than spectator-based, but amateur sports still put pressure on the EPL 
in the form of time and money redirected away from following professional soccer.  
                                                        
42 Michael Porter, "The Five Competitive Forces That Shape Strategy," Havard Business Review 
(Harvard Business Publishing), 2008. 
43 Harris Interactive, " Football Continues to be America's Favorite Sport; the Gap With Baseball 
Narrows Slightly this Year," HarrisInteractive.com, January 17, 2013, 
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/NewsRoom/HarrisPolls/tabid/447/ctl/ReadCustom%20Default/mid/150
8/ArticleId/1136/Default.aspx. 
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As for non-sport entertainment, any other leisure options available to consumers 
pose a potential threat to the NFL and EPL, including, but not limited to: television, 
movies, music, art, theatre, and personal recreation. However, the notion that any one of 
these substitutes would command enough of a consumer’s attention, interest, and 
spending to wholly disrupt the economic operations of the NFL or EPL is currently 
quite unlikely, as customer loyalty is stronger in the professional sports industry than in 
the entertainment industry, as spending patterns on professional sports and 
entertainment are generally linked in the form of discretionary income. Whether that 
remains the case over the long term remains to be seen. 
 
Bargaining Power of Buyers 
The next force described by Porter is the bargaining power of buyers. Porter 
notes that “powerful customers […] can capture more value by forcing down prices, 
demanding better quality or more service (thereby driving up costs) and generally 
playing industry participants off against one another, all at the expense of industry 
profitability.”44 The NFL and EPL face different groups of “consumers”, including fans, 
corporate partners, and broadcasting partners. At the corporate level, the power of 
buyers is relatively low. The top leagues both auction off their broadcast and licensing 
rights to the highest bidder, and if one partner cannot compete, another will step in to 
take its place – the properties are simply too valuable to pass on. For example, when the 
NFL’s decade-long deal with Reebok as the official league apparel sponsor expired, 
Nike offered nearly 30 percent more per year to acquire the rights. However, the                                                         
44 Michael Porter, "The Five Competitive Forces That Shape Strategy," Havard Business Review 
(Harvard Business Publishing), 2008. 
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bargaining power of corporate buyers is relatively low only because the consumer 
support of each of these leagues is so strong. For now, the fan base of each league is 
established, widespread, and still growing. This allows the leagues to command higher 
fees from its external partners – broadcasters can charge brands high advertising fees, 
and the leagues know this information when entering a negotiation. However, as soon 
as consumer preferences shift away from these leagues for whatever reason, the 
bargaining power of corporate buyers starts to increase. Fewer “eyeballs” translates to 
lower advertising fees, which increases the ability of broadcasters to negotiate down 
rights fees. Therefore, the real threat to the NFL and EPL resides at the most basic level: 
the fans. Spending on sports is not infinitely inelastic – at a certain price, fans will 
simply stop showing up to games or buying sport-specific cable packages. As the 
preferences of fans evolve, so too must a professional sports league, as the final section 
of this thesis will explain. 
 
Bargaining Power of Suppliers 
On the supplier side, bargaining power is not as diffused as it is among buyers. 
For professional sports leagues, the most important suppliers – the players – hold a 
certain amount of bargaining power in that players represent a much more significant 
portion of the cost structure of leagues compared to firms in other industries. In the 
EPL, around 70 percent of club revenues are spent on player wages, while in the NFL, 
players in total receive only about 47 percent of league revenue.45 Specific to the NFL,                                                         
45 Deloitte, "Annual Review of Football Finance – Highlights," Sports Business Group, June 2013, 
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
UnitedKingdom/Local%20Assets/Documents/Industries/Sports%20Business%20Group/deloitte-uk-sbg-
arff-2013-highlights-download.pdf. 
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the league must also deal with labor unions such as the NFL Players Association and 
the NFL Referees Association. Recent labor stoppages as a result of failure to reach 
agreements with these two entities – the 2011 player lockout and 2012 referee lockout – 
highlighted the bargaining power of these suppliers. The player lockout, while only 
costing the league the preseason and no regular season games, threatened to cost each 
city hosting an NFL franchise nearly $160 million if the season had been cancelled. The 
referee lockout, on the other hand, had more intangible negative effects on the social 
value created by the brand of the NFL – once the quality of games deteriorated due to 
inadequate officiating, a firestorm of negative press eventually pressured the league into 
reaching a deal with the referee union. While the bargaining power of suppliers does 
influence each of these leagues, the fact that the symbiotic nature of the relationship 
between the league’s suppliers and the league itself encourages both parties to maintain 
some semblance of peace ensures that this influence does not become too strong for a 
league to manage. 
 
Intensity of Competitive Rivalry 
The final factor described by Porter’s five forces is the intensity of the 
competitive rivalry between firms within the industry. Porter neatly sums up 
competitive rivalry into one line: “High rivalry limits the profitability of an industry.”46 
In other words, when the rivalry between existing firms is intense in that firms are 
exacting any measures necessary to gain market share, the industry as a whole tends to 
lose profit potential. For the NFL and EPL, existing competitive rivals are other                                                         
46 Michael Porter, "The Five Competitive Forces That Shape Strategy," Havard Business Review 
(Harvard Business Publishing), 2008. 
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domestic and international professional sports leagues – in the US, Major League 
Baseball, the National Basketball Association, Major League Soccer, the National 
Hockey League, and so on; for the UK, the LV= County Championship (cricket), Aviva 
Premiership (rugby), and other smaller leagues. The NFL captured the title of “most 
popular US professional sport” from Major League Baseball during the 1960s, and has 
never looked back, as no other sport has surpassed the league in popularity since the 
Harris Poll began.47 In 2013, for the first time in years, an MLB World Series game 
earned a higher rating than a competing NFL regular season broadcast, a testament to 
the size of the gap between the two leagues in terms of economic and social value 
creation. On the other side of the Atlantic, soccer has been the most dominant sport in 
the UK since perhaps before the creation of the Football Association in the late 1800s, 
and the EPL still leverages that popularity today to outpace its industry rivals by a wide, 
wide margin; for example, the Aviva Premiership actually operated at a £16.2 million 
loss in 2012.48 As it stands, only a severe shift in cultural preferences away from each 
of these leagues stands to pose a threat to their economic supremacy, as the intensity of 
competitive rivalry is fairly low. However, both the EPL and NFL must continue 
leveraging their own strategic resources if they hope to continue on the successful path 
of value creation they currently hold. 
Factor Threat Level 
Threat of Entrants Low 
Threat of Substitutes Mild 
Bargaining Power: Moderate                                                         
47 Harris Interactive, " Football Continues to be America's Favorite Sport; the Gap With Baseball 
Narrows Slightly this Year," HarrisInteractive.com, January 17, 2013, 
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/NewsRoom/HarrisPolls/tabid/447/ctl/ReadCustom%20Default/mid/150
8/ArticleId/1136/Default.aspx. 
48 ESPN Staff, Premiership chief hails improving financial picture, May 20, 2012, 
http://www.espnscrum.com/premiership-2011-12/rugby/story/164350.html. 
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Consumers 
Bargaining Power: 
Suppliers Mild 
Competitive Rivalry Moderate (NFL), Mild (EPL) 
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PART II: INTERNAL ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
 The modified PEST analysis above focuses mainly on the external factors that 
influence how the NFL and EPL do business, while the following resource-based view 
(RBV) analysis focuses more on the strategic resources available to each league and 
how they leverage them to create economic and social value. The RBV model created 
by David Collis and Cynthia Montgomery in 1995 and most recently updated by Jay 
Barney in 2001 is a more thorough manifestation of the traditional SWOT (strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities, threats) analysis tool. It assesses the value of business 
resources based on the ability of competitors to imitate them, their durability, their 
appropriability, and their substitutability. The resource-based view combines the 
findings of external analysis tools (i.e. PEST and Five Forces) with internal analysis of 
a firm’s available resources to assess a firm’s strategy in terms of its ability to create 
value and generate an advantage in the market. 
 Each of these two leagues has numerous resources at its disposal given the 
momentum that each is currently riding as the top league in their domestic market. 
However, there are several resources that have been especially vital to the success of 
each league, and the RBV analysis provides an approach that identifies the extent to 
which each of these resources is unique in its ability to drive sustainable competitive 
advantage. 
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RBV Analysis - National Football League 
Resource 1: Parity 
 As mentioned briefly in the PEST analysis, one of the most important resources 
leveraged by the National Football League is its emphasis on competitive parity. The 
NFL has made a strategic choice to encourage parity, and it leverages this choice to 
create value. Several factors contribute to the parity of the league, including the 
structure of the draft, the emphasis on equal revenue sharing, and the restrictive salary 
cap. First, the NFL Draft, in which NFL teams select eligible players from the ranks of 
college football, ensures parity by allowing the teams to select players in reverse order 
from how they finished the previous season. In other words, the “worst” team of the 
previous season receives the rights to the first pick in each round. First proposed by 
Philadelphia Eagles owner Bert Bell in 1935, the reverse-order draft does not guarantee 
success – the list of top draft picks who have failed in the NFL is not a short one – but 
in general, it provides an injection of talent for teams that are struggling. Combined 
with the salary cap restrictions included in the collective bargaining agreement, the 
reverse-order draft virtually ensures that small market teams (such as the Green Bay 
Packers) can compete on a long-term basis with large market teams (like the New York 
Giants). Notable tenets of the most recent CBA that ensure this parity include a rookie 
wage scale that cut average rookie contracts by 50 percent, allowing small market teams 
to better afford both young talent and veteran experience, and the continuation of the 
“franchise tag” designation, which allows a team to keep a player from becoming an 
unrestricted free agent under certain conditions.  
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Finally, a steadfast commitment to equal revenue sharing ensures that the 
economic value created by the league, regardless of the franchise that actually 
completes the transaction, gets shared across all 32 franchises. While some franchises 
are in fact more valuable than others (the Dallas Cowboys are worth approximately 
three times as much as the Oakland Raiders), the revenue sharing component offers 
teams the economic means to attract top talent, invest in competitive infrastructure, and 
level the proverbial playing field.49 The following chart compares average win 
percentages and standard deviation of win percentages of clubs by league. The chart 
separates franchises/clubs on the basis of time spent in the league.50  
League 
2-10 Years in League 11-20 Years in League 21-30 Years in League 
Avg 
Win% 
S.D. 
Win% # 
Avg 
Win% 
S.D. 
Win% # 
Avg 
Win% 
S.D. 
Win% # 
NFL 0.44 0.14 7 0.51 0.19 5 0.5 0.18 25 
EPL 0.41 0.11 15 0.45 0.12 14 0.55 0.12 14 
The data above leads to several conclusions. First, relatively young expansion 
teams in the NFL are more competitive with their more established rivals than recently 
promoted teams in the EPL. This suggests that the parity-promoting provisions of the 
reverse-order draft, revenue sharing, and the salary cap allow new teams to rise to a 
competitive talent level in a short amount of time. Only six points separate the average 
win percentages of the youngest and oldest teams, while in the EPL, a full fourteen 
percentage points distinguish the established “old guard” from clubs that are fighting to 
avoid relegation. In addition to encouraging the success of new franchises, the 
provisions also ensure that teams are not uniformly successful (or unsuccessful) in the                                                         
49 Mike Ozanian, The Most Valuable NFL Teams, August 14, 2013, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2013/08/14/the-most-valuable-nfl-teams/. 
50 Carlos Pestana Barros, Muradali Ibrahimo and Stefan Szymanski, Transatlantic Sport (Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited, 2002). 
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long term, as expressed in the higher standard deviation of win percentages. This helps 
insulate the NFL from a dip in fan engagement that might result from the perception 
that any one team is predestined to be unable to be competitive on the field. 
Imitable? While the NFL’s emphasis on parity is virtually unparalleled in the 
professional sports league industry as it stands today, it would not be unrealistic to 
assume that an existing league could make changes to emphasize parity on a similar 
scale, or that a new league could start up with similar provisions in place to ensure 
parity. However, for the time being, the NFL is so deeply and uniquely invested in its 
emphasis on competitive and economic parity (the two go hand in hand) that it offers a 
source of competitive advantage due to the “any given Sunday” ideal that consumers 
appreciate. 
 Durable? Again, the NFL currently leads when it comes to ensuring competitive 
parity, and as long as the league continues to commit to the provisions that ensure that 
parity, it is a durable resource. There are no realistic external threats to the parity of the 
league, in that each franchise is virtually ensured relatively equal access to the equal 
talent base distribution encouraged by the league. However, if for whatever reason the 
powers that be within the league decide to adjust these provisions in such a way that 
competitive parity is threatened, the NFL could diminish the value of this resource as a 
source of competitive advantage in the marketplace. 
 Appropriable? The test of appropriability determines who really “owns” the 
value (in this case, economic and social) that a resource creates. For the NFL, its 
competitive parity is appropriable only in the sense that external league partners benefit 
from the value that such parity creates. In other words, the value created by parity in the 
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NFL does not solely benefit the league, but the external stakeholders that also benefit 
from this parity generate reciprocal value for the league, especially broadcasters. For 
example, the entities that partner with the current last-place team in the league, the 
Jacksonville Jaguars, benefit from the provisions in place that encourage 
underperforming teams to win more games in the coming years. However, these 
stakeholders then return that value to the league in the form of increased licensing fees, 
broadcast fees, etc. if the Jaguars start winning games, selling more tickets, and drawing 
more viewers. This iterative success is what fuels the NFL’s “money machine” – 
something the final section of this thesis will address later on. 
 Substitutable? The test of substitutability determines whether or not a competing 
firm can implement another resource to replace the value that a resource creates. In this 
case, while it might seem that there is no substitute for competitive parity at first glance, 
there are in fact ways to create value without this resource in place. The most obvious 
example is in the European professional sports model, where a handful of teams 
dominate the top few spots of domestic leagues each season. The section on promotion 
and relegation as a resource leveraged by the EPL will address that example in more 
thorough detail. In the United States, however, the provisions ensuring competitive 
parity are fairly steadfast as a non-substitutable resource. The NBA, MLB, and NHL all 
have similar provisions to some extent or another, but none has established an 
appropriate substitute for those used by the NFL. The provisions encouraging 
competitive and economic parity in the NFL are the most valuable resource available to 
the league. 
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Resource 2: Season Structure  
 Along with the strategic initiatives that the NFL takes to ensure competitive 
parity, another key resource leveraged by the league is the relatively small number of 
games in a season. While the violent, physically demanding nature of the game itself 
necessarily limits the number of games teams can play over the four-month NFL regular 
season schedule, the 16-game structure still represents an asset for the league to 
leverage in that the league can capture value on a shorter timeline through higher ticket 
prices and broadcasting rights fees.  
 Imitable? Competing firms in the professional sports industry are not entirely 
unable to imitate the limited schedule of the NFL, but many are – baseball, hockey, and 
basketball each require long seasons due to a combination of historical momentum and 
fan expectations. Major League Soccer owners recently discussed a reduction in season 
length from 34 games to 28 games, but the value of the limited schedule does not only 
lie in the number of games, but also in how consumers perceive the importance of those 
games.51 To that end, the NFL has leveraged the “DVR proof” nature of the game as 
discussed above and combined it with a schedule that keeps fans engaged for each and 
every game. What follows from this combination is a stranglehold on dominant 
television ratings that no other entertainment option – much less another professional 
sports league – can match: 
“NFL games on CBS, FOX and NBC averaged 19.3 million viewers – 154 
percent higher than the average primetime viewership among the four major 
                                                        
51 Steve Davis, A reduced, 28-game MLS season may be around the corner, September 3, 2013, 
http://prosoccertalk.nbcsports.com/2013/09/03/a-reduced-28-game-mls-season-may-be-around-the-
corner/. 
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over-the-air networks (7.6 million average on ABC, CBS, FOX, NBC). That 
NFL advantage is nearly triple the 52 percent edge of a decade ago.”52 
One might argue that the NFL has backed into the good fortune of being based on a 
game that can only be played once a week for a few months, but regardless of such 
luck, how the league leverages that schedule is an extremely valuable and virtually 
inimitable strategic resource. 
 Durable? The NFL has discussed the possibility of an 18-game schedule, but the 
league has faced resistance from the NFL Players Association and fans. However, for 
the immediate future, the fact that the nature of the game of football lends itself to a 
limited schedule and the success that that schedule has drawn would indicate that the 
league will likely stick to some form of a limited, weekly league schedule that takes 
place during the fall and winter. As with the resource of competitive and economic 
parity, the only foreseeable situation in which the strategic value of the NFL’s season 
structure would become diminished is if the league itself decided to make significant 
changes that negatively affected consumer preferences toward it. 
 Appropriable? The league and its partners capture the value created by the 
league’s 16-game schedule. Once again, this iterative success allows the NFL to keep 
the value it creates “in house”, as the threat of another entity appropriating the value of 
the NFL’s season structure is prohibitively low. 
 Substitutable? The NBA and MLB have long leveraged an approach opposite 
the NFL: long, high-volume seasons where consistency surpasses temporary hot streaks 
                                                        
52 NFL Communications, More than 200 million tune in to NFL games in 2011 — NFL TV recap, January 
5, 2012, http://nflcommunications.com/2012/01/05/more-than-200-million-tune-in-to-nfl-games-in-2011-
nfl-tv-recap/. 
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in terms of franchise success on the field. Since the sports of baseball and basketball are 
more suited to a long season and scheduling structure, the NBA and MLB can substitute 
the short season of the NFL with seasons that involve many more individual games. 
Therefore, there is a substitute for the NFL’s season structure, but there are two caveats: 
1) a long season must align with the nature of the actual sport or game being played, 
and 2) the league must find ways to capture value on a longer timeline. For example, 
there is simply no chance than an MLB or NBA team could charge prices that are as 
high as those charged by the NFL for comparable in-stadium experiences. According to 
the 2010 Fan Cost Index compiled by industry analysts at the Team Marketing Report, 
the average cost of a family of four attending an MLB game was $194.98, while the 
same index measured the cost of attending an NFL game at $420.54.5354 An NFL 
franchise can “justify” these prices because they only operate eight regular season home 
games per year, as opposed to 81 of MLB and 41 for the NBA. Their margins are 
higher, and the economic value created by the short schedule supersedes that of a long, 
high-volume schedule. 
 
Resource 3: Authenticity  
Apart from the tangible organizational aspects of the league, the authenticity of 
the NFL as an entertainment option offers another valuable strategic resource as the 
league creates economic and social value. As Michael Oriard puts it:  
                                                        
53 Team Marketing Report, "2010 MLB Fan Cost Index," TeamMarketing.com, 2010, 
https://teammarketing.com/public/files/2010_MLB_FCI.pdf. 
54 Team Marketing Report, "Moneyball: NFL tickets not going down," TeamMarketing.com, 2010, 
https://teammarketing.com/public/files/2010_NFL_FCI.pdf. 
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“while the NFL developed strategies for competing in an amped-up and 
crowded entertainment marketplace, football’s enduring power derived from its 
authenticity […] Football players really were as big, fast, strong, and talented – 
and in constant physical danger – as they seemed.”55 
Simply put, the NFL has found itself in charge of the nation’s most compelling reality 
show, and it has leveraged that authenticity at every opportunity to create a competitive 
advantage. 
 Imitable? The inherent authenticity of the NFL stems mainly from the on-field 
product: the game of football itself. When the authenticity of a sport is in question, it 
becomes more difficult for a league to create value. For example, Major League 
Baseball suffered a widespread steroids scandal starting in the late 1990s, the effects of 
which are still being felt today. Once the authenticity of the product was compromised, 
the brand suffered, and so did its ability to create value. The image of the league was 
tarnished, and fans responded negatively, resulting in an almost unheard-of six percent 
drop in inflation-adjusted league revenue from 2001 to 2002.56 However, the league 
was able to recover from that perceived loss of authenticity, and MLB now owns the 
second spot behind the NFL in terms of US professional sports league revenue. The 
NFL has experienced its own individual steroids scandals, but the public backlash has 
been far less intense, perhaps due to the nature of the game of football as violent and 
dangerous as opposed to baseball, which is steeped in a tradition of skill and 
coordination. Authenticity is imitable, but it is also essential.                                                         
55 Michael Oriard, Brand NFL: Making and Selling America's Favorite Sport (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2007). 
56 Maury Brown, MLB Revenues Grown From $1.4 Billion in 1995 to $7 Billion in 2010, April 14, 2011, 
http://www.bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5167:mlb-revenues-
grown-from-14-billion-in-1995-to-7-billion-in-2010&Itemid=42. 
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 Durable? The biggest threat to the authenticity of the product provided by the 
NFL is how consumers respond to the increasingly publicized negative effects of the 
game on players. In August of 2013, the league settled for $765 million with a group of 
about 4,500 former players who sued the league, “accusing it of concealing the dangers 
of concussions and rushing injured players back onto the field while glorifying and 
profiting from the kind of bone-jarring hits that make for spectacular highlight-reel 
footage.”57 While this settlement addressed the most pressing legal action facing the 
league, the public perception of the game seems to be affecting how it creates value, 
even if only in marginal amounts. For example, according to Rob Lampman, “20,000 
less kids are playing football” than last year.58 The league’s authenticity might become 
its own worst enemy in the long run if enough talent starts to migrate away from 
football, allowing the well of spectacular athletes funneling into the NFL to run dry. For 
now, however, the league still relies on the authenticity of the game to create a 
competitive advantage. 
 Appropriable? As with the resource of competitive parity, the value created by 
the NFL via its authenticity tends to filter back to the league in the long run, as opposed 
to becoming dissipated amongst external partners. This is especially true in the context 
of corporate partnerships. A league sponsorship is inherently more valuable when 
consumers view the league as an authentic, trustworthy product because consumers 
ascribe that trustworthiness to the sponsor’s product. That loyalty can be leveraged by 
                                                        
57 Associated Press, NFL, ex-players agree to $765M settlement in concussions suit, August 29, 2013, 
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap1000000235494/article/nfl-explayers-agree-to-765m-settlement-in-
concussions-suit. 
58 Rob Lampman, interview by Keagen Edwards, (October 10, 2013). 
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brands via affect transfer that raises the proverbial tide that floats the boats of both the 
NFL and the brand in question. 
 Substitutable? Any sport can be authentic – it’s the presentation of the sport that 
determines whether or not that authenticity translates into value creation for the league. 
The Extreme Football League (XFL) tried to substitute the authenticity of the NFL, to 
disastrous results, dying a quick death when fans saw right through the superfluous 
packaging surrounding the league. Created in 2001 by World Wrestling Federation 
CEO Vince McMahon, the XFL “[gave] football the WWF treatment – more violence, 
more trash-talking, more sexual titillation on the sidelines […] the league offered 
parody […] of the most popular sport in the United States, which already pushed the 
boundaries of the body’s physical limits, of acceptable violence, of spectacular display, 
of media saturation.”59 The failure of the XFL illustrates how the authenticity of the 
game of football, combined with a presentation that enhances that authentic quality, 
represents a strategically valuable resource for the NFL. 
 
RBV Analysis - English Premier League 
Resource 1: Promotion and Regulation 
 The English Premier League follows the European club model, which includes 
provisions for promotion and relegation of individual clubs between the various 
divisions of English soccer. Specifically, the bottom three clubs in terms of points are 
“relegated” to the Championship (formerly “Division One” from the creation of the 
Premier League in 1992 to 2004, and “Division Two” before then) for the next season,                                                         
59 Michael Oriard, Brand NFL: Making and Selling America's Favorite Sport (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2007). 
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while the top two teams in the Championship and the winner of a tournament of the 
next four teams join the Premier League. This model is not unique to English soccer – 
in fact, most national soccer leagues incorporate some form of promotion and relegation 
into their organization – but the way the EPL leverages and markets this structure 
creates unique value. 
 Imitable? As previously mentioned, the actual system of promotion and 
relegation is relatively easy to imitate. However, the EPL turns this structure into a 
strategic resource that creates a competitive advantage in the market by leveraging the 
various interesting situations it creates. While the NFL relies heavily on equal 
competitive parity, the EPL approaches competitive parity from a different angle: it 
combines the “any given Sunday” ideal – that any team can beat any other team during 
any one game – with a set of “mini-competitions”, where the race for the Premier 
League title, for UEFA Champions League qualification, and to avoid relegation all 
increase fan interest. Perhaps the most compelling example of how the EPL leverages 
the promotion and relegation system is “Survival Sunday”, a term coined by British 
broadcaster Sky Sports to describe the final day of EPL action. On Survival Sunday, 
every EPL team plays at the same time in ten matches across the UK, and the fight to 
avoid relegation (bottom three teams), reach the Champions League (top four teams) 
and even win the title can all come down to this final day of matches. In 2012, Survival 
Sunday featured Manchester United and Manchester City each playing at home, at the 
same time, separated by only two points in the league table. Fans of the EPL worldwide 
were treated to perhaps the most compelling final day of action in league history when 
City, needing a win after United had edged Sunderland only minutes before, came back 
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from a goal down in stoppage time to beat relegation-doomed QPR and earn their first 
Premier League title. This sort of drama raises overall fan interest in the league and 
keeps supporters of every team interested from the first game to the last, even without a 
playoff system. 
 Durable? The promotion and relegation system has been in place in English 
soccer since 1892. As a strategic resource, this system is about as durable as they come, 
with the potential for value creation running long into the future. As with certain 
strategic resources leveraged by the NFL, the only foreseeable disruption to the 
promotion and relegation system of the EPL would likely come from the inside. Though 
revenue sharing is not as prevalent in the EPL as in the NFL, it is enough to effectively 
prevent a scenario where the same sets of teams are promoted and relegated so 
frequently that the system loses its significance. 
 Appropriable? The value created by the promotion and relegation system could 
theoretically be captured by the lower levels of English soccer, from the Championship 
down to level 7B of the National League System. However, similar to how the NFL has 
a vested interest in a strong NCAA, so too does the Premier League have a vested 
interest in a strong hierarchy of teams below it in the promotion and relegation system. 
In theory, even lowly Fishburn Park FC of Whitby, North Yorkshire, England (which 
lists a “Worst Dressed Player” award on the home page of its club website) could rise 
through the ranks and take on the likes of Manchester United for the EPL title. For a 
team to rise up from the Championship to the EPL and become competitive represents a 
unique opportunity for the EPL to create value in that it can draw on a totally new set of 
consumers when a new team enters the league. 
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 Substitutable? The American professional sports model that includes playoffs 
and a reverse-order draft would be the most obvious substitute to a promotion and 
relegation system, but the European model is so ingrained in the UK that it is effectively 
insulated against potential substitutes. While a new league with an American-style 
structure might be able to carve out a niche in the market based on novelty, it could not 
compete against traditional European leagues, and especially the EPL, on the basis of 
economic and social value creation. 
 
Resource 2: Multiple Competitions 
 While the National Football League effectively stands alone as a value-creating 
entity, where franchises only ever play against each other in the context of one 
competition, the English Premier League benefits from the multiple competitions that 
occur in international soccer. Clubs can compete with not only other EPL clubs, but also 
clubs in other domestic leagues as part of other organized competitions, including the 
UEFA Champions League, UEFA Europa League, and FA Cup on a yearly basis and 
the UEFA European Championship and FIFA Club World Cup every four years.   
 Imitable? The game of soccer provides a common ground for clubs all over the 
world to compete – the rules are virtually identical in every professional league, as are 
the infrastructure and organization requirements. An EPL team like Chelsea can travel 
to play against Schalke 04 in Germany, FC Basel in Switzerland, and Steaua Bucuresti 
in Romania in the group stage of the 2013 Champions League alone – without fear of 
administrative incongruities between countries. Some other sports, like baseball and 
basketball, lend themselves to international competition (given a certain amount of rules 
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variations), while sports like American football are effectively isolated to their own 
market because of the unique nature of the game and the fact that no other countries 
understand, appreciate, or participate in it on the same level. The multiple competition 
model is imitable, but only if the sport in question allows it.  
 Durable? The multiple competition model is durable as long as each individual 
competition maintains a certain level of popularity, prestige, and economic success. The 
Champions League (gross commercial revenue in 2012/13: €1.3 billion) and FA Cup 
(gross payouts in 2010/11: £24 million) provide a direct economic stimulus to the EPL, 
as well as an indirect social value stimulus by allowing EPL clubs opportunities to 
market internationally.60 However, if these competitions become less popular, these 
value creation opportunities become less of a strategic resource for the EPL to leverage. 
 Appropriable? The EPL benefits from multiple competitions in that it can 
generate economic and social value through its clubs separate from league-specific 
activities. Though the “rising tide” theory does apply to some extent in that an increase 
in interest in soccer international benefits each individual domestic league, organizing 
bodies like UEFA or the FA primarily capture the actual economic and social value 
created within the context of each of these competitions.  
 Substitutable? Leagues can only substitute an isolated, closed league schedule 
(e.g. the NFL) for the multiple competition model. While the single competition model 
has not prevented the NFL, MLB, or NBA from achieving economic success, it may be 
more difficult for a league looking to compete with the EPL to take on the single 
                                                        
60 Deloitte, "The Financial Impact of the FA Cup," January 2012, 
http://www.thefa.com/TheFACup/News/2012/Jan/~/media/421387323A984557A3686BA18D383E6D.as
hx. 
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competition model given the extent to which the multiple competition model dominates 
the European sports landscape. 
 
Resource 3: Tradition 
 The authenticity of the NFL is a strategically valuable resource, and the EPL 
benefits from an authentic message as well, but more so from the tradition surrounding 
the game, the clubs, and the leagues as whole. Though the EPL in its current iteration 
has only existed since 1992, the twenty clubs that make up the Premier League have 
operated for an average of 85 years each, which is much longer than the average NFL 
team (53 years). The EPL leverages this history in the way it presents and promotes 
itself – at the league level and at the club level.  
 Imitable? The most inimitable resource available to the EPL is the league’s 
tradition. While other leagues might be able to imitate administrative resources like the 
promotion and relegation system and the multiple competition model, no competitor in 
the UK market can match the history of the EPL in terms of either sheer age or accrued 
social momentum, which ensures that tradition as a resource for the EPL (like 
authenticity for the NFL) is insulated from the threat of a competitor attempting to 
imitate it. If a new league were to seek to compete with the EPL, it could not do so on 
the basis of tradition, and would instead have to rely on its novelty to create economic 
and social value. 
 Durable? The tradition of the EPL can only get stronger as time goes on, but the 
value that consumers put on that tradition may shift. For now, however, tradition is a 
durable strategic resource. Any threat to the durability of the tradition of the EPL as a 
 48  
resource would have to come from the inside, if league management decides to abandon 
the tradition of the league as the thread that runs through all of its consumer-facing 
messages. 
 Appropriable? Like with the NFL’s resource of authenticity, the EPL’s resource 
of tradition can create value that external partners can appropriate, but the EPL can 
benefit from that reciprocal value. Brands, sponsors, and broadcasting companies that 
value this tradition can align themselves with the EPL and appropriate some of the 
value that the league has built up over the years, but it tends to filter back to the league 
either explicitly (via capital) or implicitly (through increased fan interest).  
 Substitutable? The only potential substitute for the tradition leveraged by the 
EPL would be a novelty effect of a new league. Either the sport itself or the way the 
competing league presents itself would have to be so new and enticing to consumers 
that it would replace tradition as a strategic resource. 
 
NFL Resources EPL Resources 
Parity Promotion and Relegation 
Season Structure Multiple Competitions 
Authenticity Tradition 
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PART III: A NEW MODEL FOR VALUE CREATION 
 The National Football League and English Premier League have clearly 
established dominant positions in the professional sports industry in their domestic 
markets. Looking at how they respond to external factors and leverage their own 
internal resources offers a rich range of insights into how the ideal professional sports 
league can most effectively create value. The following section of this thesis 
synthesizes these insights into a concise model to determine how a professional sports 
league creates economic and social value. 
 
Fundamental Elements 
 The model is built on four elements: the Game, the League, the Consumers, and 
Partners. These foundational elements represent the four most fundamental aspects of a 
professional sports league: 
The Game is the most basic of the four elements. It includes the sport, activity, 
or game that a professional league is built on in its purest form. For the NFL, the Game 
is football; for the EPL, the Game is soccer. The Game can exist without the League, 
without Consumers, and without Partners. However, the Game itself does not create 
economic or social value, as value creation can occur only in the context of an 
organizing body.   
The League is the organizing body that regulates the Game into a business 
enterprise. The League is responsible for franchise formation, game scheduling, stadium 
funding, and any other administrative requirement necessary to bring the Game to 
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market. It also includes players, coaches, staff, and any employee that works as part of 
the Game.  
Consumers are those who are interested in the Game as it manifests itself in the 
form of the League. This group includes the most rabid fan all the way down to the 
most casual observer.  
Partners are external entities who align themselves with the League in order to 
attract Consumers. Examples of Partners include broadcasters, licensees, sponsors, and 
brands.  
 
Interactions Between Elements 
 Each interaction between each of these four elements represents a chance for a 
league to create value. 
 
         
1) Infrastructure 
2) Entertainment 
3) Growth 
4) Affiliation 
5) Capital 
6) Distribution 
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1) Game - League: Infrastructure 
Neither the Game nor the League can create value in and of themselves. 
However, the combination of the Game and the League in the context of infrastructure 
forms the basis for a professional sports league to create value. The League’s assets 
provide infrastructure so that the Game can be organized and administrated to 
Consumers. Assets that the League leverages can be tangible or intangible. Tangible 
assets include physical property and capital owned or raised by league investors. 
Physical property like stadiums, team facilities, and equipment provide a “place” for the 
Game to exist in the context of the League. Before the Game can reach Consumers or 
Partners, the League must first establish an actual location for the Game to take place 
and provide all the necessary physical requirements. The NFL cannot create value 
without a field for its players to play on, just as the United States Professional 
Poolplayers Association cannot create value without tables and cues. Most fans 
effectively take this for granted – however, the confirmation bias associated with this 
fact is evident in that no professional sports league has ever existed without the 
fundamental physical requirements of the Game in place. Even professional online 
gaming leagues require a certain amount of physical “inputs” to function. As for capital, 
owner and investor capital effectively funds the infrastructure required to start and 
maintain a professional sports league.  
Intangible assets include legal arrangements such as collective bargaining 
agreements and political provisions, a strong leadership team, and the cohesiveness that 
results from coordinating league activities under one “roof”. Though the collective 
bargaining agreement in and of itself is not a requirement for a professional sports 
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league to succeed (depending on which markets the league intends to compete in), some 
form of rules dictating how those who play the Game are compensated and how revenue 
is or is not shared amongst constituents of the League (usually franchises/clubs) must be 
in place. Other CBA provisions can dictate more nebulous matters (e.g., how much an 
NBA player is paid for participating in the Three-Point Shootout at the All-Star 
Weekend), but any contractual arrangement that intends to regulate how a Game is 
organized and administrated by the League represents an asset that the League can 
leverage to create value, either directly or indirectly. Aside from the regulations 
involved in creating infrastructure for a professional sports league, the league can 
benefit from the vision and direction of a strong leader or leadership team. The NFL 
might not exist as the market leader it is today without the contributions of Bert Bell, 
Pete Rozelle, and Al Davis. 
 
2) Game - Consumers: Entertainment  
On the most fundamental level, Consumers interact with the Game to be 
entertained. The motivations of fandom are well-studied; Daniel Wann’s seminal work 
from 1995 put forth eight factors that encourage fans (and, by extension, Consumers) to 
engage in sports fandom: eustress, self-esteem, escape, entertainment, economic factors 
(mainly in the form of gambling), aesthetics, group affiliation, and family needs.61 
While a professional sports league can consider each of these factors when developing a 
strategy to create value, the most important interaction that the League can control is the 
entertainment value of the Game to Consumers. In this context, entertainment includes                                                         
61 Daniel Wann, "Preliminary Validation of the Sport Fan Motivation Scale," Journal of Sport and Social 
Issues 19, no. 4 (November 1995). 
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every one of Wann’s factors to a certain extent – without entertainment, the other 
motivations are effectively null and void. For example, a Consumer will not gain any 
positive group affiliation if he or she is too bored of a Game to associate with it. The 
Super Bowl offers a prime example of how an organization has leveraged Entertainment 
to create value – between the music stars leading the halftime show, the high prices for 
commercials during the game, and the extravagant pregame and postgame ceremonies, 
the NFL has turned its championship event into more of a cultural spectacle than a 
football game. 
 
3) Game - Partners: Growth 
The interaction between the Game and external Partners is a two-way street, in 
that each of the two foundational elements in question stands to benefit from growth as 
a way for a professional sports league to create value. On one hand, the Partners 
leverage the positive feelings and the communal “language” of a Game to communicate 
their own messages to Consumers and grow their business. This growth can occur in 
various ways on differing scales – from a broadcasting partner like Fox trying to capture 
the record-setting audiences of an NFL Super Bowl, to a simple concession vendor 
looking to launch a new product at a minor-league baseball stadium. On the other hand, 
the contributions of Partners to the League in the form of capital encourage the growth 
of the Game, either directly or indirectly. For example, in Louisiana, Cox 
Communications and the Louisiana Seafood Board (Partners) sponsored a refurbished 
basketball court (benefitting the Game of basketball) as part of a joint effort with the 
New Orleans Pelicans (an NBA franchise and part of a League). This reciprocal growth 
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is only half of the reason why Partners are so essential to the success of a professional 
sports league; the other half is described below in the interaction between Partners and 
Consumers. 
 
4) League - Consumers: Affiliation 
The interaction between the League and Consumers is perhaps the most 
important opportunity for a professional sports league to create value, but it is also the 
most difficult to build and maintain, and the easiest to lose if the wrong strategic 
initiatives are in place. Affiliation works on two levels: first, the League provides a 
marketplace for Consumers to actually engage the Game in a setting that is organized, 
efficient, and economically valuable. Usually, this occurs at the franchise, team, or club 
level – Consumers usually generate economic activity in the context of their team, not 
directly with the league. For example, licensed apparel with the league logo is dwarfed 
in popularity (and revenue) by apparel with a specific team’s logo. This ties in with the 
other angle of affiliation: emotional connection. Consumers most often associate 
themselves with the League through a franchise, team, or club, and the passion and 
fanaticism expressed by Consumers, the emotional ties that keep fans coming back year 
after year regardless of the outcomes on the field, are arguably a league’s most valuable 
asset. Creating and caring for the connection between the League and the Consumers 
should be the prime directive for a professional sports league, because without it, every 
other interaction is virtually a moot point. The section on evolution below will describe 
this in more detail. 
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5) League - Partners: Capital  
Besides the internal capital contributions of individuals within the League itself, 
a professional sports league relies on the external capital contributions of Partners to 
fund its operations. While the extent to which Partners contribute capital varies from 
league to league, the most successful leagues bring in extensive external capital relative 
to operational costs. This capital comes in the form of television broadcast rights fees, 
digital media rights fees, sponsorship fees, licensing fees, naming rights fees, and other 
sources that involve Partners paying for the right to associate with a League. The 
amounts of these fees are often directly correlated with the number of Consumers that 
interact with the League, either at the league or franchise level. This is due to the value 
of the following interaction, distribution. 
 
6) Consumers - Partners: Distribution  
Partners and Consumers interact in the context of distribution – whether Partners 
are distributing League content (acquired by an agreement with the League that 
involves the exchange of capital) or they are distributing their own content and 
marketing messages that exhibit some explicit or implicit association with the League. 
Partners are the vehicles by which Consumers can take in League content without 
actually being in the place where the Game is happening, which is a crucial component 
for a professional sports league looking to make the leap from creating value on a local 
or regional level to creating value on a national or even global scale. 
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Evolution 
The final and most crucial piece of this model for professional sports league 
success is the ability for the league to evolve and adapt to changing parameters. Each of 
the four foundational elements – the Game, the League, Consumers, and Partners – are 
subject to changes for different reasons, and the interactions between them (as described 
above) must change as well. Sometimes a league can take proactive control of these 
changes, and other times the league can do nothing but react to these changes, but in 
either case, taking the proper action is crucial to either building towards success or 
maintaining it in both the short and long term. 
Entertainment 
The most important change that can occur for a professional sports league is a 
shift in the preferences of the Consumer. Not coincidentally, this is also the change over 
which a league has the least control. While a league can directly affect how the Game is 
played, how the League is organized and administrated, and what relationships it has 
with external Partners, the will of the Consumer puts the league firmly into a 
reactionary position. In terms of entertainment, the league must do everything it can to 
ensure that Consumers are engaged with their on-field product (the Game). For 
example, while the Consumers of today may prefer violent, dangerous sports like 
football, the Consumers of tomorrow may not feel the same natural motivation to enjoy 
the NFL. A professional league can approach this shift in two ways: it can change how 
the Game is played in order to maximize the entertainment value to Consumers, or it 
can modify the Consumer-facing messages that it issues around the game. As negative 
news stories (and more importantly, lawsuits) start to mount, the NFL faces the reality 
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that football is detrimental to the health of its players in the long term. It must weigh the 
benefits of changing the rules of the Game to decrease these negative health effects with 
the costs of diluting the very aspects of the game that entertain its consumers. The EPL 
is benefitting from the reverse of this trend, as Americans who viewed international 
soccer as low scoring, boring, and slow start to become more exposed to the game 
through various media channels (even including video games like Electronic Arts’ FIFA 
series), understand the game more thoroughly, and consume more of it than in the past. 
A new sports league or an existing league seeking to gain market share must first 
understand what drives the entertainment value of the Game in the eyes of Consumers, 
and then decide how to approach changes in Consumer preferences towards the Game. 
A Consumer will feel the way he or she feels about a Game, but the Consumers are not 
buying tickets from, rooting for, or subscribing to the Game on television – they do all 
of these in the context of the League. This is why the next interaction, affiliation, is the 
best opportunity for a league to adjust to changing Consumer preferences.  
Affiliation 
As Consumer preferences towards the Game change, the Consumers’ affiliation 
with the League does too. This delicate balance of making sure the Game still entertains 
Consumers, while driving both the reach and intensity of fan avidity towards the 
franchises, teams, or clubs of the League, is the most important way a professional 
sports league can evolve. Consumers will not affiliate with a franchise that plays a 
Game that does not offer them any entertainment value, so the Game is the foundation 
for the Consumer to interact with the League through affiliation. However, just because 
a Game entertains Consumers does not necessarily mean that they will affiliate with a 
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League that administrates that Game. Volleyball, tennis, and bowling are all extremely 
popular Games, but the leagues that organize them professionally create nowhere near 
as much economic and social value as the NFL, EPL or even action sports or boxing 
organizations. Even for established leagues, they must constantly invest in efforts to 
generate and maintain affiliation. For example, fan loyalty programs like the one 
operated by the NBA’s Indiana Pacers provide additional benefits to fans the longer 
they hold a season ticket. However, such efforts are more rooted in economic interests 
than in the interest of driving affiliation; the growing American trend towards personal 
seat licenses (PSLs), which represent a fee paid by a Consumer for the right to buy a 
ticket to a specific seat, has had a net positive impact on revenues, but has also been met 
with significant Consumer backlash. The fact that simply offering an entertaining Game 
does not necessarily result in value creation indicates that the League must offer some 
value above and beyond the Game itself to generate affiliation from Consumers. This 
“added value” can be expressed in the way the League interacts with the Game via 
infrastructure. 
Infrastructure 
Consumers cannot interact with a professional sports league if the League has 
not established a certain level of infrastructure. From the actual legal entity of the 
league down to the physical locations in which players play the Game, the infrastructure 
that the League creates must evolve and adapt to the preferences of the Consumer. For 
example, an improvement in the at-home viewing experience (HDTVs, DVRs, fantasy 
football) has threatened to decrease stadium attendance at NFL games. The League of 
the NFL accordingly has a vested interest in improving the in-stadium experience, and 
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some teams are starting to introduce Wi-Fi connectivity and cellular service boosts at 
their stadiums. In fact, the NFL has recently established new league-wide requirements 
that “ensure minimum capacity levels for concurrent downloads, uploads or browsing, 
while setting similar thresholds for phone calls and texting” for the 2014 season.62 
Leagues must take actions such as these to ensure that the value created by the league is 
not appropriated entirely by external Partners. With that said, leagues must also ensure 
that their relationships with Partners are providing sufficient value to Consumers in the 
context of distribution. 
 Distribution 
A professional sports league must be in tune with that the way its Partners are 
distributing content to Consumers and make the necessary changes to adapt to shifting 
preferences of Consumers. Major League Baseball is an example of a league that failed 
to stay ahead of the curve on such changes and is now adjusting its Partner relationships 
to make up for lost time. In the middle 20th century, MLB had established a dominant 
position in the market as the “sport of radio”, as both the nature of the Game of baseball 
and the infrastructure put in place by the League supported partnerships with radio 
broadcasters. However, MLB stood idly by as the NFL made the leap into the top spot 
in American sports in the 1960s as football became the “sport of television”, surpassing 
baseball in both viewership and the economic value of its Partner relationships. While 
MLB could not necessarily help that the violent, fast-paced NFL offered more 
entertainment on television to a wider range of Consumers, it was slow to abandon its 
                                                        
62 Daniel Kaplan, "NFL sets stadium Wi-Fi/cell standards," SportsBusinessDaily.com, October 21, 2013, 
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2013/10/21/Leagues-and-Governing-Bodies/NFL-
WiFi.aspx. 
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radio partnerships. This initial failure to evolve due to an over-reliance on traditional 
media distribution offers a lesson to other professional sports leagues: if distribution 
changes, so too must the Partners with which a League aligns itself. Major League 
Baseball has since recovered from losing the distribution battle to the NFL, and was 
actually the first of the “Big Four” American leagues to offer a comprehensive out-of-
market live video streaming service to Consumers in MLB.TV, which launched in 2002 
and averaged about 1.1 million live streams per day in 2012.63 This proactive move on 
the part of the leadership at MLB shows that perhaps the league learned from its own 
history and decided not to make the same mistake twice. Even the most “traditional” of 
leagues can take advantage of new Partner relationships in distributing its content to 
Consumers. This also represents an opportunity to generate more capital for the League 
itself. 
Capital 
Capital, in and of itself, does not evolve – the sources and beneficiaries of 
capital, on the other hand, can and necessarily should evolve for a professional sports 
league to be successful. Partnerships have to change as Consumer preferences change. 
For example, tobacco companies used to be prevalent sponsors of professional sports – 
Marlboro sponsored the NFL in the 1950s, NASCAR teams plastered tobacco company 
logos on their cars, and MLB players appeared in cigarette advertisements (including 
Lou Gehrig, who proudly proclaimed that he smoked Camels because they “didn’t get 
his wind”). However, as Consumers became more aware of the negative effects of                                                         
63 MLB.com, "Ten years ago today MLB.TV: Digital Media's most successful live video subscription 
product debuted - in 'high resolution' 300K broadband video," MLB.com, August 26, 2012, 
http://losangeles.dodgers.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20120826&content_id=37372302&vkey=pr_ml
bcom&c_id=mlbcom. 
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tobacco and public sentiment towards such sponsorships soured, Leagues turned away 
from the capital offered by tobacco companies. The NFL dropped Marlboro, MLB 
barred its players from wearing their uniforms in cigarette advertisements in the 1950s 
and officially restricted smokeless tobacco use for the first time in 2012, and NASCAR 
even picked up Nicorette as a sponsor as sponsor in the early 2000s. On the other side 
of the equation, Leagues have increasingly sought capital from Partners that Consumers 
have positive opinions of, such as the US Automobile Association and their military 
appreciation campaign in conjunction with the NFL. A League must take an interest not 
in just acquiring capital, but in acquiring capital from the right Partners to adjust to 
changing Consumer preferences. Without these strategically crafted partnerships, the 
league will be less effective in growing its Game and Partners will see less growth as 
well. 
Growth 
As long as a League executes strategic relationships with Partners in a way that 
keeps pace with the changing preferences of the Consumer, it can grow its Game and 
offer growth to those same Partners. The value that the League generates in the context 
of providing entertainment, infrastructure, and affiliation for Consumers, combined with 
the value that Partners generate in terms of capital and distribution, can offer growth 
only if those interactions evolve and adapt as described above. If, and only if, these 
interactions are managed carefully to match Consumer preferences, then the League can 
expand the Game and Partners can leverage the Game for their own growth. Teams in 
the EPL can reinvest in their youth club system because the league has created unique 
value at every other level. The NFL can invest in USA Football and the Play60 
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campaign because the other pieces of value creation for their consumers are firmly in 
place. On the Partners side, a broadcasting company or sponsoring brand maximizes its 
own growth potential by aligning with a league that has the other “pieces of the puzzle” 
in place. Therefore, a new professional sports league would have to convince Partners 
that it either has these pieces in place or has a strategically organized plan for getting 
them in place. 
 
Strategic Decision Points 
 Due to the intricate nature of the interplay between external pressures and 
internal resources, a catch-all blueprint for professional sports value creation that 
addresses every single strategic choice a professional sports organization might face 
does not, and necessarily cannot, exist. However, there are several key decision points 
that any professional sports organization must make in order to establish their strategic 
positioning in the market. These decision points involve one or more of the interactions 
between the fundamental elements of the model described above.  
Decision 1: Mass Appeal vs. Core Appeal 
 The most basic decision a professional sports organization must make is whether 
it will attempt to create the maximum possible amount of economic and social value for 
the widest possible range of Consumers, or whether it will segment and target its 
strategic initiatives for value creation to a smaller group of “core” Consumers. The 
National Football League and English Premier League have each made decisions to 
downplay or even strip away certain controversial aspects of the Game they organize in 
order to increase their appeal to casual Consumers. The NFL has implemented various 
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restrictions on players and teams to ensure a certain family-friendly image, including 
fines for excessive celebrations, suspensions for dangerous hits, and harsh punishments 
for steroid use and unfair play. As for the EPL, rules allowing increased substitutions, 
changes in the value of a win relative to that of a tie, and efforts to combat soccer 
hooliganism have all contributed to a product that appeals to more fans both on and off 
of the field. These changes in infrastructure affect the entertainment value of the Game 
by opening up more opportunities for affiliation. In addition, a League appeals to a 
wider range of Partners when it offers broad appeal to Consumers, which increases 
opportunities for growth, capital, and distribution. 
 However, there is another option for a professional sports organization – it can 
cater to a specific group of core Consumers and focus on creating value in economic 
and social value with these Consumers in mind. The Pareto Rule, popularized by 
business management consultant Joseph Juran, stipulates that roughly 80 percent of the 
revenues (i.e. economic value) of an organization come from 20 percent of the users 
(i.e. Consumers) of that organization’s product or service. While these are only general 
figures, the concept holds true in that value creation occurs primarily amongst core 
consumers.  Leagues that implement a strategy that focuses on their core Consumers – 
like-minded individuals that gain entertainment value from a very specific set of 
influences and balk at any changes to those influences – essentially forgo the volume of 
mass appeal in favor of the commitment and avidity of core appeal.  
For example, the National Hockey League failed in various attempts at mass 
appeal, and has reneged on those changes in order to appease their most avid 
Consumers. Perhaps the most notorious of these changes was FoxTrax, a broadcast 
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technology that illuminated the puck for TV viewers. While casual fans expressed 
interest in the technology, the Hockey News organized a reader’s poll where “90% of 
the 1,813 respondents voiced disapproval of FOX’s puck.”64 FOX vice president of 
media relations Vince Wladika responded to the results of the poll thusly: 
“Those are the people you don’t need to attract. Those are the same people who, 
while they’re your core audience, they’ve been the same core audience 
forever…And unless you build upon it, hockey is going to stay at the same level 
it is.”65 
Though this was a decision that originated at the Partner level (i.e. FOX), as opposed to 
the League level, the NHL still faced the repercussions as peak average Nielsen Ratings 
(the standard industry measure of TV viewership) fell by one third – from 2.1 to 1.4 – 
between 1996 and 1998. The FoxTrax feature was discontinued in 1998 as 
Commissioner Gary Bettman distanced himself and the NHL from the project. 
 The leadership in a professional sports organization must identify the capability 
of a Game to appeal to a mass audience and weigh that against the value it can create 
for a core group of Consumers. Some organizations must focus on increasing their reach 
to the casual fan. Other, more controversial organizations face innate barriers to mass 
appeal, such as the Ultimate Fighting Championship and its violent, visceral nature. 
Such organizations must focus their value creation efforts primarily on their core 
Consumers, because without them, the organization could not survive, much less create 
unique economic and social value. 
                                                        
64 The Hockey News, "No! No! No! Here's what you have to say about FoxTrax: THN Poll," The Hockey 
News, 1996. 
65 M. Brender, "FoxTrax loses 10-1," The Hockey News, 1996. 
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Decision 2: Parity vs. Perennial Contenders 
 The decision on whether to lean on parity as a strategic tool for value creation, 
as opposed to rules and regulations that necessarily allow a limited number of 
franchises/clubs to rise to the top, must be made based on the preferences of the 
Consumer. Closed leagues, like the NFL, benefit from provisions that enhance parity as 
discussed in Part II of this thesis because there is only one “competition” (i.e. the NFL 
season) that franchises can compete in. Open leagues, like the EPL and others that 
follow the European model of professional sports, can leverage the fact that only a 
handful of teams settle at the top of the league standings year after year by marketing 
these top franchises internationally. Accordingly, the leadership of a professional sports 
organization must be aware of the competitive environment and decide whether to align 
with accepted models (e.g. a closed league with an emphasis on parity in the US market, 
an open league with perennial contenders in a European market), or create novelty value 
by going against the grain. For example, a new closed league in a European market may 
benefit from parity provisions more than the traditional open leagues, in that clubs 
might otherwise be stuck at the bottom with no resources to dig their way out of a 
competitive disadvantage. On the other hand, US leagues like Major League Soccer 
benefit from an open league relationship with CONCACAF (the Confederation of 
North, Central American and Caribbean Association Football), as top contenders like 
the New York Red Bulls and the Los Angeles Galaxy have the opportunity to increase 
the exposure of the MLS to new groups of Consumers, which attracts a unique set of 
Partners. 
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Decision 3: Traditional Distribution vs. New Distribution  
 Professional sports organizations must decide whether to make the change to 
take advantage of new distribution models, as opposed to relying on traditional 
distribution, in accordance with the preferences of the Consumer. The example of Major 
League Baseball given previously shows both sides of such a decision: if a League 
moves slowly in capitalizing on new Partners and new distribution when Consumers 
prefer them over traditional relationships, then the organization forgoes value and loses 
ground to competitors in the industry. However, the League must also balance how it 
allocates resources to unproven distribution relationships, because the opportunity cost 
of enriching its current relationships may outweigh the potential for new sources of 
value creation. Leagues must embrace the risk of adopting new (and even 
underdeveloped) distribution platforms in order to establish a first-mover advantage. 
However, an organization must understand the willingness of Consumers to engage 
with these platforms before acting on a strategic decision either way. 
 
Understand and Act 
 Making the strategic decisions listed above requires a professional sports 
organization to both know the factors that influence the decision, and then act on that 
knowledge to adjust its strategy to maximize value creation. To understand the 
situation, an organization can: 
 1) Engage in market research. Fan surveys, depth interviews with key 
influencers and Partners, and secondary research compiled by other entities can all offer 
useful information towards how a league should adjust its strategy. 
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 2) Look at comparable historical situations. For example, a league weighing the 
decision to commit resources to a new distribution relationship might consider how 
MLB benefitted from aligning itself with the digital streaming model early on. 
 3) Create projections that account for the available information and compare the 
outcomes. If a League knows that it can capture 100,000 more casual Consumers and 
$1,000,000 in additional revenue at the expense of 1,000 core Consumers and $100,000 
of revenue from those fans (assuming core Consumers spend ten times as much as 
casual Consumers), it might be inclined to implement provisions that attract those 
casual fans, even if it alienates some core fans. 
 These strategies for understanding the environment in which an organization is 
making a strategic decision allow the organization to use the most important available 
information to consider their options. Once that information has been gathered, 
however, it must adjust strategy accordingly. If the research indicates that Consumers 
are starting to become indifferent to a League because the same few teams win every 
year, the League might consider introducing more restrictive parity provisions. For 
example, the National Basketball Association has enacted a more strict salary cap in its 
most recent collective bargaining agreement that harshly penalizes repeat violators of 
the cap, forcing franchises to re-evaluate their spending and (in theory) distributing 
talent more evenly. This is a strategic response to Consumer preferences that influences 
entertainment and affiliation value. The National Football League and English Premier 
League have established their position in the market, but neither can afford to rest on 
previous successes. They must engage in activities to keep their “fingers on the pulse” 
of the Consumer, and implement the appropriate changes in strategy in order to ensure 
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that they remain the most economically and socially successful professional sports 
leagues in the world. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The model outlined above builds on a strategic external and internal analysis of 
the current market leaders in the professional sports industry: the National Football 
League and the English Premier League. The only guarantee in this industry is that on a 
long enough time scale, the environment in which professional sports leagues operate 
will change. These changes start with the Consumer and filter down through every other 
aspect of a sports organization, including the League, its Partners, and even the Game 
itself. How an organization responds, adapts to, and evolves in the context of these 
changes dictates the ability of that league to maintain successful value creation in both 
economic and social terms. Only those that are willing to invest in understanding the 
will of the Consumer and act on that information in bold, strategically valuable ways 
will be able to sustain competitive success in the professional sports industry. 
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